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NOTE
DATA LOCALIZATION:
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
OF PRIVACY LITIGATION
H JACQUELINE BREHMER*
This Note addresses a key unintended consequence of recent data privacy
litigation before the European Court of Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court.
Two cases—Data Protection Commissioner v. Schrems and United
States v. Microsoft Corp.—contravene the principles upon which the internet
was founded by removing legal and scalable mechanisms for cross-border data
transfers. While these cases do not directly create data localization regimes, they
highlight the irreconcilably different approaches to data privacy held by the
United States and the European Union and eliminate valid options for transfer
such that localization is the only remaining scalable solution. Data localization
is not solely expensive for companies; it also puts user privacy and global
enterprise security at risk by creating greater government access to data,
expanding the attack surface for cybersecurity threats, and minimizing the
efficacy of data security tools. Thus, while these cases may increase user trust
and privacy in the short-term, they are likely to lead to data localization and
have long-term effects on internet use and access worldwide.
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INTRODUCTION
When litigation is used to create policy, it can have unintended
consequences.1 This is especially true in the data security and privacy
sectors, where the law and technology are developing at different rates.
Thus, when lawyers and judges do not fully consider the legal and
1. See Mary Mitchell & Dana A. Remus, Interstitial Exclusivities After Association for
Molecular Pathology, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 34, 39 (2014) (commenting
that “[i]mpact litigation can be an effective means of placing pressure on the other
branches of government . . . , but courts are not as effective as the other branches of
government at crafting and implementing long-term solutions that adequately account
for costs and second order consequences”).

2018]

DATA LOCALIZATION

929

practical repercussions of technology, they run the risk of
undermining the successful advocates’ original position. Nothing
illustrates this risk more than the recent data privacy cases in the
United States and European Union. Advocates in these cases brought
their claims to defend privacy rights; however, their success before the
European Court of Justice (CJEU)2 and the Second Circuit will
paradoxically have the opposite effect by negatively impacting global
user privacy and enterprise cybersecurity.3
Two cases—Data Protection Commissioner v. Schrems (Schrems II)4 before
the CJEU and United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft Ireland)5 before
the U.S. Supreme Court—along with pending challenges to the EUU.S. Privacy Shield, are forcing this issue. In the former case, the
plaintiff, Mr. Schrems, is challenging the ability of U.S. companies to
transfer EU user data from the European Union to the United States
using Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs), which are EU-issued
contractual clauses that seek to establish safeguards for cross-border
data transfers.6 Mr. Schrems claims that such mechanisms fail to
provide adequate safeguards for transfer.7 Simultaneously, in Microsoft
Ireland, Microsoft is arguing that the application of U.S. law to law
enforcement’s ability to compel user data stored abroad by American
companies is an inappropriate extraterritorial extension of law

2. This Note uses the phrase “CJEU data privacy cases” to collectively refer to Data
Protection Commissioner v. Schrems (“Schrems I”) and Data Protection Commissioner v. Schrems
(“Schrems II”). Data Prot. Comm’r v. Schrems (Schrems II) [2016] IEHC 414 (Hi. Ct.)
(Ir.); Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r (Schrems I), 2014 E.C.R. 6.
3. See In re Search of Info. Associated with [Redacted]@gmail.com that is Stored
at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., Case No. 16-mj-00757 (BAH), 2017 WL
3445634, at *27 (D.D.C. July 31, 2017) (commenting that “the Microsoft decision may
incentivize states to pass data localization laws to restrict their nationals from locating
customer data abroad”); Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY
L.J. 677, 680 (2015) (“Data localization increases the ability of governments to surveil
and even oppress their own populations . . . . By creating national barriers to data,
data localization measures break up the World Wide Web, which was designed to share
information across the globe.”).
4. [2016] IEHC 414 (Hi. Ct.) (Ir.).
5. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft
Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), petition for
cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 17-2 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017).
6. Complaint against Facebook Ireland Ltd from Maximilian Schrems, to Data
Prot. Comm’r at 10 (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.scribd.com/document/292096534/
Complaint-against-Facebook-Ireland-Ltd.
7. Id.
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enforcement powers.8 Though the former argument restrains
commercial transfers of user data and the latter limits law enforcement
access to data, they both ultimately impede cross-border data transfers
such that data localization is the sole scalable legal and business
solution available to U.S. companies.
While these cases do not directly cause the implementation of data
localization laws or regulations, they do highlight the irreconcilable
differences between the EU and U.S. approaches to data privacy.
Unfortunately, these differences ultimately boil down to key aspects of the
U.S. legal system, such as Article III standing.9 Thus, if the CJEU and the
U.S. Supreme Court find for the original plaintiffs, the United States will
be forced to either walk back foundational aspects of the U.S. legal system
or put U.S. corporations in a position where they must localize data.10
Data localization is not new, and governments normally implement
localization through restrictive laws and regulations that bar the
movement of data in and out of a country.11 Such laws are generally
criticized for being expensive for corporations and protectionist.12
Unfortunately, the costs are not only financial.13 Localization will also
negatively impact user privacy and enterprise security worldwide by
creating greater government access to user data,14 minimizing the
efficacy of corporate privacy and security controls, and expanding the
8. Brief for Appellant at 1–2, In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account
Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (No. 14-2985-cv), 2014 WL 7004807, at *1–2.
9. See Affidavit of Stephen I. Vladeck ¶¶ 80–95, Schrems II [2016] IEHC 414 (Hi. Ct.) (Ir.).
10. This Note recognizes that there are other alternatives for data transfers to the
United States besides Privacy Shield and SCCs; however, these bases, such as consent,
are highly fact-specific, specialized, and may be subject to disclosure requirements.
Additionally, the legal diversity and complexity of these options likely make them out
of reach for many companies.
11. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., DATA PROTECTION REGULATION
AND INTERNATIONAL DATA FLOWS: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 13
(2016), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtlstict2016d1_en.pdf.
12. Id. at 4.
13. See infra Sections V.B–C.
14. This Note uses “user data” to describe a wide range of data that is collected
and processed by commercial entities and law enforcement. This includes: (1) noncontent information, such as personal identifying information or subscriber
information (e.g., username, registration IP address, or date of birth);
(2) transactional information, such IP address logs or billing records; and (3) content
information, such as production of emails or a wiretaps. H. MARSHALL JARRETT ET AL.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 121–24 (2009) https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf.
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corporate network.15 The CJEU’s data privacy and Microsoft Ireland
cases facilitate localization by highlighting the unamenable differences
between EU and U.S. approaches to privacy and by assigning a
territorial identity to data. Thus, while these cases may provide an
appearance of greater protection, they place user privacy and security
at greater risk of exposure to good and bad actors alike.
This Note explores data localization as a key unintended
consequence of the CJEU’s data privacy cases and the Second Circuit’s
Microsoft Ireland case. It argues that these cases will undermine user
privacy and global enterprise security by restricting the movement of
data across borders and forcing corporations to localize by invalidating
key data transfer mechanisms. Part I first outlines the concept of data
localization and then details EU and U.S. data privacy laws and the
various mechanisms for transfer from the European Union to the
United States. This Part also discusses the EU and U.S. perspectives on
standing and notes that this irreconcilable difference could
undermine cross-border data transfers between the European Union
and United States. Part II discusses the legal mechanisms used for data
transfers by commercial entities and law enforcement. Part III analyzes
two pending cases—Schrems II and Microsoft Ireland—and how these
cases affect the validity of data transfer mechanisms.
Part IV addresses how these cases erect barriers to the movement of
data and remove key mechanisms for data transfer. This Part also
discusses how localization undermines user privacy and security by
providing governments with greater access to user data and limiting the
efficacy of data security tools. Finally, Part V concludes by asking the CJEU
and U.S. Supreme Court to rule in favor of greater security and privacy.
I.

BACKGROUND

If the courts in Schrems II and Microsoft Ireland hold for the plaintiffs,
data localization will be a practical rather than legal consequence. To
reach this conclusion, it is necessary to understand how the United
States and the European Union conceptualize and implement data
privacy protections, including an analysis of key U.S. surveillance
15. See infra Sections V.B–C (explaining that localization benefits foreign
governments at the cost of user privacy by limiting the ability of companies to shift data
across national borders when the political climate changes); see also Stephen
Northcutt, Security Laboratory: Defense in Depth Series, SANS TECH. INSTIT. (last visited
Feb. 7, 2018) https://www.sans.edu/cyber-research/security-laboratory/article/didattack-surface (defining attack surface as “our exposure, the reachable and exploitable
vulnerabilities that we have”).
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programs and redress mechanisms available when a privacy violation
has occurred. Ultimately, the validity of EU-U.S. cross-border data
transfers turns on whether the transfers from the European Union are
conducted pursuant to a privacy regime commensurate with, but not
necessarily identical to, those provided in the European Union. The U.S.
system is unlikely to meet the EU standard because the United States and
European Union have such fundamentally different approaches to
privacy law that it is unlikely the European Union would deem the U.S.
system adequate. Consequently, because transfers are no longer an
option, localizing data will become the norm, rather than the exception.
A.

Data Localization

Generally, countries maintain three primary justifications for
implementing data localization regulations. First, some countries view
localization as critical to protecting their respective citizens from U.S.
surveillance.16 Second, others justify localization because it benefits
their domestic law enforcement by increasing the accessibility of user
data through local legal processes.17 Third, data localization also has a
protectionist motive, and countries have used it as means to bolster
domestic markets.18
Despite these purported benefits, data localization has several
negative consequences. One particularly worrisome consequence is
the direct financial burden placed on companies and consumers.19 In
2013, data localization was predicted to cost cloud computing services
16. See Chander & Lê, supra note 3, at 713–14 (explaining that the propensity to pass
data localization laws may have stemmed from the 2013 leak of classified U.S. surveillance
documents by National Security Agency (NSA) employee Edward Snowden).
17. See Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement Access to Data Across Borders: The Evolving
Security and Rights Issues, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 473, 478 (2016) (explaining
that “[s]uch laws also facilitate domestic surveillance”); infra Section II.B (discussing
the structure and issues with the current mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) process).
18. See Chander & Lê, supra note 3, at 714 (noting that data localization hinders
global markets in favor of local markets by barring foreign services access across
borders and inviting reciprocal treatment in return).
19. Id. at 699, 723–24. This cost is derived from many expenses including, but not
limited to, building data centers, employing new teams, and complying with local
regulations. Id. In response to this, some companies have begun pre-emptively
expanding their global footprint. See, e.g., Tony Kontzer, IBM Spends $1.2 Billion on
New Cloud Data Centers, NETWORK COMPUTING (Jan. 23, 2014, 12:48 PM) (describing
IBM’s investment in data centers world-wide to satisfy growing localization
requirements); Nick Wingfield & Mark Scott, Microsoft Suggests Wider Options for Foreign
Data, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2014, 5:00 PM) (commenting on Microsoft’s potential plans
for expansion in response to new data localization laws).
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between $21.5 billion and $35 billion by 2016.20 The majority of this
high cost stems from the development and staffing of necessary
technical infrastructure essential for compliance with data localization
requirements, which can amount to upwards of $60.9 million.21
Further, a long-term financial impact study of data localization in
seven major countries concluded that recently proposed or
implemented data localization legislation substantially impacted the
gross domestic products of all seven countries studied, finding welfare
losses of $63 billion in China and $193 billion in the European
Union.22 The report also suggested that while localization will increase
costs for U.S. companies, consumers worldwide will actually pay the
price as companies shift the cost of localization onto consumers.23
Despite the known financial costs of data localization, several countries
have still legislated and implemented these regimes. Though the
United States and European Union have generally permitted the free
and open flow of information, the trend towards data localization
reflects each nation’s approach to data privacy.
B.

EU and U.S. Approaches to Data Privacy

The United States’ and European Union’s different perspectives on
privacy turn on the recognition of privacy either as an aspect of
individual dignity or as a function of individual liberty.24 In Europe,

20. See DANIEL CASTRO, HOW MUCH WILL PRISM COST THE U.S. CLOUD COMPUTING
INDUSTRY? 1 (2013), http://www2.itif.org/2013-cloud-computing-costs.pdf (noting
this figure is limited to the cost of cloud computing service providers).
21. See Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Breaking the Web: Data Localization v. the
Global Internet 36–37 (U.C. Davis Legal Studies Res. Paper No. 378),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2407858 (breaking down the construction and maintenance
costs of foreign data centers); Loretta Chao & Paulo Trevisani, Brazil Legislators Bear Down
on Internet Bill, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2013, 6:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/brazillegislators-bear-down-on-internet-bill-1384384450 (explaining that data localization
“could cost U.S. companies tens of billions of dollars”).
22. See Matthias Bauer et al., THE COSTS OF DATA LOCALISATION: FRIENDLY FIRE ON
ECONOMIC RECOVERY 2 (2014) (arguing that unilateral data restrictions create larger
economic losses).
23. Id.; see also Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV.
729, 753 (2016) (clarifying that internet companies have to increase user fees or
reduce services because of the high costs brought about by localization requirements).
24. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004) (“Continental privacy protections are, at their core, a
form of protection of a right to respect and personal dignity. The core continental privacy
rights are rights to one’s image, name, and reputation . . . . By contrast, America . . . is much
more oriented toward values of liberty, and especially liberty against the state. At its
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privacy is considered a part of the individual’s dignity, and citizens have
the “right to be shielded against unwanted public exposure.”25 As such,
the right to privacy, and more specifically the right to privacy in
communications, is enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights.26 Conversely, the U.S. approach to privacy derives from the
concept of liberty and hinges on the idea that citizens should be free
from state intrusion.27 Consequently, U.S. privacy protections were
originally derived from the Fourth Amendment but have developed in
U.S. jurisprudence within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth,
and Fifth Amendments.
These theoretical differences are reflected in substantive
distinctions in EU and U.S. data privacy laws and regulations.28 As
described below, the European Union uses a comprehensive approach
with broad, overarching data protection laws that expands across
various sectors, applies extraterritorially, and protects individuals
located in the European Union regardless of citizenship.29 Unlike the
European Union, the United States employs a sectoral approach,
consisting of different laws and regulations for each commercial
sector.30 This seemingly inconsequential distinction is at the basis of
the data privacy disputes before the CJEU.
1.

EU data privacy
The EU Data Protection Directive (Directive) is the foundation of
the European data privacy regulation.31 Adopted in 1995, the Directive

conceptual core, the American right to privacy still takes much the form that it took in
the eighteenth century: It is the right to freedom from intrusions by the state,
especially in one’s own home.”).
25. Id.
26. See id. at 1153; see also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
arts. 7–8, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 [hereinafter Charter of Rights].
27. See Whitman, supra note 24, at 1161.
28. Id.
29. EU General Data Protection Regulation, EPIC (last visited Feb. 7, 2018),
https://epic.org/international/eu_general_data_protection_reg.html
(describing
the multiple key points of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that
collectively make it a comprehensive data regulation regime).
30. Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S.
Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 505–06 (1995) (addressing the American anticomprehensive model sentiment and analyzing the U.S. privacy law by sector).
31. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter
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comprehensively details the data rights of EU citizens, outlines the
obligations of governments and corporations with respect to those
rights, and requires that all data transfers maintain adequate
safeguards to protect the personal information of EU individuals.32
The Directive is being replaced in May 2018 by the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR).33 In terms of data transfer provisions,
the GDPR expands and clarifies the mechanisms and requirements for
data transfer from the European Union to third-party countries.34
However, the change in laws from the Directive to the GDPR is unlikely
to have any impact on the admissibility of the claims in Schrems II and
Microsoft Ireland because the underlying issues in question are so
fundamental to rights guaranteed under the EU Charter.
The principles for cross-border data transfers are laid out in Articles
25 and 26 of the Directive.35 Article 25 requires that transfers of
personal data from the European Union to a third-party country
ensure an adequate level of protection.36 This determination depends
on the country’s domestic laws, the nature of the data transferred, and

Directive]; Marc Rotenberg & David Jacobs, Updating the Law of Information Privacy: The
New Framework of the European Union, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 605, 617–18 (2013).
32. See MARTIN A. WEISS & KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44257, U.S.EU DATA PRIVACY: FROM SAFE HARBOR TO PRIVACY SHIELD 2 (2016), https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R44257.pdf.
33. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation) 2016 O.J. (L. 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR]. The
GDPR is a comprehensive data privacy regime that implements several new and
aggressive requirements for the handling of EU resident data. Detlev Gabel & Tim
Hickman, Cross-Border Data Transfers—Unlocking the EU General Data Protection
Regulation, in UNLOCKING THE EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION: A
PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE EU’S NEW DATA PROTECTION LAW (2017),
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/chapter-13-cross-border-datatransfers-unlocking-eu-general-data-protection. The more notable changes from the
Directive to the GDPR include: increased fines for non-compliance of up to 4% of
global turnover, express territorial application, and the right to be forgotten. Id. With
some exceptions, the provisions on transfer remain largely the same. Id. The
provisions governing cross-border data transfers are reflected in Articles 44 through
50, which primarily clarifies the different methodologies of transfer. Id.
34. See Marc Rotenberg & David Jacobs, Updating the Law of Information Privacy: The
New Framework of the European Union, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 605, 640–41 (2013).
35. See Directive, supra note 31, art. 25–26. Under the GDPR, data transfer
provisions are located in articles 44 through 50. GDPR, arts. 44–50.
36. Id. art. 25.
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the purpose of the transfer.37 Even if a third-party country’s domestic
laws do not ensure sufficient safeguards, a country can still meet the
requisite standard based upon international commitments negotiated
between the third-party country and the European Commission.38
Notably, the Directive does not require identical laws but instead
requires that the third-party country employ domestic laws or maintain
international obligations that create protections “essentially
equivalent” to those provided to EU citizens.39 The Directive
empowers the European Commission to render an adequacy decision40
determining whether the domestic law of the third-party state “ensures
an adequate level of protection . . . for the protection of private lives
and basic freedoms and rights of individuals.”41
If Article 25 is not met, the Directive prohibits personal data
transfers from the EU to a third-party country unless the country meets
one of the exceptions listed under Article 26;42 the exceptions fall into
three categories. First, Article 26 provides six derogations for transfer
where it is completed pursuant to the data subject’s consent, is
necessary for the performance of a contract, required on grounds of
public importance, or legally required.43 These derogations are factbased and are to be interpreted strictly.44 Second, an EU member state
may authorize transfer to a country where the data controller “adduces
adequate safeguards with respect to the protection of the privacy and
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals.”45 If the member
state decides to grant such permission to a third-party country, the state

37. Id. art. 25(2).
38. Id. art. 25(4)–(6). The European Commission is the Executive of the
European Union and is responsible for developing and implementing EU strategies.
Organisational Structure, EURO. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/info/abouteuropean-commission/organisational-structure_en (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
39. Case C-362/14, Schrems I, 2014 E.C.R. 6, ¶ 73.
40. An adequacy decision is a finding of “whether a third country ensures an
adequate level of protection by reason of its domestic law or the of the international
commitments it has entered into.” Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection
of Personal Data in Third Countries, EURO. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
data-protection/international-transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 7,
2018) [hereinafter Commission Decisions].
41. Directive, supra note 31, art. 25.
42. Id. recital 57.
43. Id. art. 26, ¶ 1.
44. Case C-119/12, Probst v. mr.nexnet GmbH, ¶ 23 (Nov. 22, 2012),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-119/12&language=EN#.
45. Directive, supra note 31, art. 26, ¶ 2.
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must inform the Commission and other member states.46 Third,
transfers may also be conducted pursuant to contractual clauses
referred to as SCCs. The European Commission approves these
clauses and they are integrated into data transfer agreements between
EU and U.S. data controllers.47
Additionally, the Directive and GDPR provide two important clauses
regarding law enforcement access to user data. First, both the
Directive and GDPR allow for member states to adopt laws and
regulations restricting rights and obligations when such restriction is
necessary for national security, defense, or public safety.48 This
exception allows for the member states to change how data is collected,
processed, and transferred whenever the member state is able to justify
such behavior for national security purposes.49 Second, the GDPR
changes the methodology for U.S. law enforcement to access user data
stored in EU nations by requiring that production of user data be
requested pursuant to an international agreement, such as a Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT).50 When the data is controlled by an EU
entity, this reflects the standard process that U.S. law enforcement must
comply with to obtain EU user data. However, this raises questions as to
whether the GDPR is memorializing the Second Circuit’s decision in
Microsoft Ireland, discussed in Section III.B, such that the Supreme
Court’s holding in that case will be rendered irrelevant.
2.

U.S. data privacy
The United States takes a different approach to data privacy laws and
regulations. Whereas the European Union employs a comprehensive
approach, the United States uses a sectoral approach, consisting of
different laws and regulations per commercial sector.51 This approach

46. Id. art. 26, ¶ 3.
47. SCCs are also often referred to as Model Contract Clauses (MCCs). Model Contracts
for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries, EURO. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/
info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-transfers-outside-eu/model-contracts-transferpersonal-data-third-countries_en (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) [hereinafter Model Contracts].
48. Directive, supra note 31, art. 13; GDPR, supra note 33, art. 23.
49. See Christopher Kuner, Reality and Illusion in EU Data Transfer Regulation Post
Schrems, 18 German L.J. 881, 895–99 (2017).
50. GDPR, supra note 33, art. 48.
51. Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S.
Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 505–06 (1995) (addressing the American anticomprehensive model sentiment and analyzing the U.S. privacy law by sector).
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has resulted in fragmented privacy protections and regulations.52
Thus, when assessing the adequacy of U.S. privacy protections, it is
critical to review U.S. law holistically because different protections and
remedies derive from different areas.53 Key to the cases described
below in Sections IV.A and IV.B are a myriad of surveillance laws and
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).
a. Challenged surveillance laws and programs
In June 2013, former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward
Snowden leaked thousands of documents from the agency and exposed
section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which
allowed the NSA to target, for intelligence purposes, the communications
of non-U.S. citizens reasonably believed to be outside of the United States.54
FISA was enacted by Congress in 1975 “to curb the problem of
unchecked domestic surveillance and intelligence-gathering abuses
undertaken by the executive branch in the post-World War II era.”55 Since
passing the law, Congress has amended it several times, most recently
through the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 (FAA). The FAA was
“designed to provide wholesale authorization for a particular kind of
warrantless electronic surveillance that had become . . . unduly
cumbersome to pursue on a case-by-case, warrant-driven basis.”56
Mr. Snowden’s leaks exposed section 702 of FISA,57 which, though requiring

52. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012)) (creating an “affirmative and continuing
obligation” for financial institutions “to respect the privacy of its customers and protect
the security and confidentiality of those customers’ nonpublic information”); The
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), Pub. L. No. 112-278, 126 Stat.
2480 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012)) (providing a framework to
protect the privacy of student records); Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub.
L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522
(2012) (regulating the interception and collection of consumer by private
corporations and law enforcement); Health Information Privacy and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2017) (creating general rules for the use and
disclosure of patient health information health care providers).
53. Written Legal Submission on Behalf of the United States of America as Amicus
Curiae at 3, Schrems II, [2016] IEHC 414 (Hi. Ct.) (Ir.) (No. 4809P),
https://www.justice.gov/civil/page/file/947821/download.
54. Id.
55. Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
56. Affidavit of Stephen I. Vladeck, supra note 9, ¶ 38.
57. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
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annual certifications authorizing collection of foreign intelligence
information, does not require the U.S. government to make a probable
cause showing that the target is a foreign agent prior to collection.58
Under section 702, the NSA may conduct what is known as PRISM
collection.59 In PRISM collection, the U.S. government sends selectors,
such as an e-mail address, to a U.S. electronic communications service
provider, such as Google or Yahoo, and compels the service provider
to share this information.60 The NSA may receive all data collected
through PRISM, and the Central Intelligence Agency or Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) may receive a select portion of the
collection.61 Each agency has minimization procedures limiting how
the agency can search and analyze collected data, how long it can be
maintained, and how it is to be destroyed.62 The procedure is also
subject to extensive oversight by the Department of Justice (DOJ), the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the FISA court.63
Following Snowden’s revelations of this and other collection
programs, the U.S. government took several steps to reform its
surveillance programs. President Obama commissioned a review
group to provide recommendations to balance U.S. national security
with its foreign policy interests and its commitment to privacy and civil
liberties.64
Based on those recommendations, the Obama
administration released Presidential Policy Directive 28 (“PPD-28”),
which expands surveillance collection principles usually applied to
U.S. citizens to foreign nationals.65 PPD-28 limits the situations in
SURVEILLANCE
ACT
6
(2014)
[hereinafter
SURVEILLANCE
REPORT],
https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf.
58. Id.
59. Id. Mr. Snowden leaked information of the PRISM collection program in
addition to a number of other surveillance pertaining to both U.S. and non-U.S.
citizens, including upstream collection, collection of bulk telephony metadata, and
surveillance of foreign government leaders.
Snowden Revelations, LAWFARE,
https://www.lawfareblog.com/snowden-revelations (last visited Feb. 7, 2018)
(providing a timeline of Edward Snowden’s disclosure of NSA classified information).
60. SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 57, at 7.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 8.
64. RICHARD A. CLARK ET AL., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY 1 (2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf.
65. Directive on Signals Intelligence Activities, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1
(Jan. 17, 2014).
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which bulk collection of information may be conducted and outlines
minimization, retention, and dissemination restrictions on the U.S.
intelligence community.66
b. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)
Under the ECPA, U.S. law enforcement is also able to access domestic
and foreign user data, including the content of communications.67 Title
II of the ECPA is known as the Stored Communications Act (SCA), and it
governs the disclosure of user data, content, and non-content to law
enforcement.68 Section 2703 details the requirements for disclosure of
user information using search warrants, subpoenas, or § 2703(d) court
orders.69 While the SCA initially allowed law enforcement to obtain
user content via a subpoena if the data had been stored for over 180
days, it is widely recognized that law enforcement is required to obtain
a warrant to compel user content.
Two relevant aspects of the SCA are user notice and the use of
national security letters (“NSLs”). The SCA, which requires that notice
of the law enforcement request be provided to the user at some point,
permits courts to issue an order barring service providers from
notifying the user of the law enforcement request.70 Often these orders
are frequently renewed or forgotten about such that they become
permanent and the user is never notified.71 Additionally, the ECPA also
expands law enforcement’s use of NSLs, which allow the FBI to compel

66. Id.; see Affidavit of Stephen I. Vladeck, supra note 9, ¶¶ 62–64.
67. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012).
68. Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
Content is generally considered to include information, such as e-mail messages, while
non-content information includes transactional or subscriber information. RICHARD
M. THOMPSON II & JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44036, STORED
COMMUNICATIONS ACT: REFORM OF THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT
(ECPA) 5 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44036.pdf.
Transactional
information generally includes more detailed logging information or email headers.
Id. Subscriber information may include subscriber name, address, phone number,
length of service, or means of payment. Id.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
70. A 2703(d) order is a combination between a warrant and a subpoena that
allows law enforcement to obtain transactional information, such as user sign-in logs,
but not email content. THOMPSON & COLE, supra note 68, at 5.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2705. See Stephen Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming
ECPA’s Secret Docket, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 313, 325–26 (2012).
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records from third-party service providers.72 NSLs are accompanied by an
indefinite gag order73 and prohibit the receiving party from disclosing the
existence of the NSL unless certain requirements are met.74
c. Redress mechanisms
The final and arguably most important change to U.S. privacy and
surveillance law following the Snowden revelations is the ability of
foreign nationals to seek redress within U.S. domestic courts for
alleged privacy violations caused by U.S. surveillance.75 This ability
highlights basic legal differences in the U.S. and EU legal systems.
While these differences include concepts such as remedies76 and
sovereign immunity,77 the most critical distinction is standing.78
Though the European Union does not require that the protections
afforded to EU residents in the United States be identical to the
European Union’s, it does require that the protections be
commensurate.79 This requirement creates a problem because the
differing attitudes toward standing may lead the European Union to
find that U.S. protections are insufficient.80

72. Law enforcement may use four distinct statutes to obtain information from
providers. ECPA (electronic communication service providers); Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–
3422) (financial institutions); National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61
Stat. 495 (codified as amended 50 U.S.C. § 3001–3234) (government institutions); Fair
Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 111-2 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1681).
73. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33320, NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS
IN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS:
LEGAL BACKGROUND 9 (2015),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33320.pdf.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c).
75. Draft Decision of the Data Protection Commissioner ¶ 62, Schrems II, [2016] IEHC
414 (Hi. Ct.) (Ir.) (No. 4809P) [hereinafter DPC Draft Decision] (emphasizing the lack of
redress mechanisms in the United States as a key reason for finding SCCs invalid).
76. See id. ¶ 51; Affidavit of Stephen I. Vladeck, supra note 9, ¶ 88; see also Fed.
Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 298 (2012) (finding that under the Privacy
Act the plaintiff must show pecuniary harm and is limited to damages of $1000 for
violations of the Act).
77. See DPC Draft Decision, supra note 75, ¶¶ 47, 59; Affidavit of Peter Swire, at 74, Schrems II, [2016] IEHC 414 (Hi. Ct.) (Ir.) (No. 4809P), https://iapp.org/media/
pdf/resource_center/Schrems-testimony-Swire.pdf; Affidavit of Stephen I. Vladeck,
supra note 9, ¶ 84–85.
78. See DPC Draft Decision, supra note 75, ¶ 52.
79. EUROPEAN COMM’N, GUIDE TO THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD 11 (2016),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/citizens-guide_en.pdf.
80. Id. at 13.
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The primary civil redress mechanism available to U.S. citizens is the
Privacy Act, which allows plaintiffs to challenge the validity of federal
agency data collection, prohibits government disclosure to third
parties, and requires agencies to be transparent about leveraged
collection systems.81 The Judicial Redress Act of 2015 (JRA) expanded
these protections to foreign nationals.82 While the JRA creates a legal
cause of action, a key challenge that each foreign plaintiff will face is
standing.83 U.S. case law has interpreted standing to require that
plaintiffs show (1) an injury-in-fact that is concrete and particularized,
and actual or imminent; (2) that there is a causal connection between
the injury and the alleged conduct; and (3) that the injury will be
redressed by the court’s decision.84 Thus, a party that is unable to make
this showing, whether a U.S. citizen or foreign national, will be
precluded from seeking relief.
Two cases—Clapper v. Amnesty International85 and Spokeo v. Robins86—
are key to analyzing the ability of foreign nationals to bring claims. In
Clapper, respondents sought a declaratory judgment that foreign
collection under FISA was unconstitutional and requested injunction
against such collection.87
The Supreme Court rejected the
respondents’ claim that there was an objective likelihood of harm and
instead found that the respondents could not show that surveillance of
their communications was actual or imminent.88 Additionally, the
Court also rejected the respondents’ claim that the organizations must
have standing to challenge the constitutionality of surveillance
programs because otherwise surveillance would be insulated from
meaningful judicial review.89 Clapper thus raises questions of how a

81. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a).
82. Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-126, 130 Stat. 282 (to be codified at 5
U.S.C. § 552a note). Outside of the JRA, foreign nationals may seek redress under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Privacy Shield, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA), or ECPA. See Affidavit of Peter Swire, supra note 77, at 1-20–1-24.
83. See DPC Draft Decision, supra note 75, ¶ 52; Irish High Court Referral to European
Court of Justice ¶ 222, Schrems II, [2016] IEHC 414 (Hi. Ct.) (Ir.) (No. 4809P) [hereinafter
ECJ Referral], https://www.dataprotection.ie/docimages/documents/Judgement3Oct17.pdf.
84. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
85. 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
86. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
87. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401.
88. Id. at 422.
89. Id. at 420–21.
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party is able to challenge U.S. surveillance when plaintiffs do not know
whether they have been surveilled.90
A corollary case to Clapper is Spokeo v. Robins, in which the respondent
alleged that a website operator published inaccurate information
about him in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.91 The
Supreme Court found that even when there is an alleged violation of
a statutory right, the plaintiff still has the burden of showing the
elements of Article III standing.92 In this case, Mr. Robins merely
alleged a procedural violation but did not adequately show a
sufficiently concrete injury.93 Thus, a party solely alleging the violation
of a statutory right without a showing of tangible, actual, and imminent
harm is precluded from seeking redress in U.S. courts.94
European courts have taken a different approach to standing when
it comes to alleged violations of the EU Charter. EU residents need
not allege “an adverse consequence” resulting from an interference
with certain articles within the Charter “to secure redress of a violation”
of the Charter.95 In the context of surveillance, the European Court of
Human Rights has also found that EU residents can challenge
surveillance programs, despite their covert nature, because to preclude
such a challenge would allow surveillance to remain
“unchallengeable.”96 The European standard for accessing the courts
is thus lower than in American courts. While some have suggested that
U.S. courts have lowered the bar for standing in the United States due
to data breach litigation97 or that the bar may be easier for foreign

90. Timothy Egar, Standing, Grandstanding and NSA Surveillance, LAWFARE (Oct. 21, 2015,
12:22 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/standing-grandstanding-and-nsa-surveillance.
91. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544.
92. Id. at 1549.
93. Id. at 1550 (commenting that “[i]t is difficult to imagine how the dissemination
of an incorrect zip code, without more, could work any concrete harm”).
94. Id.
95. See DPC Draft Decision, supra note 75, ¶ 54.
96. Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5028/71, 2 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Rep. 214, ¶¶ 30–38
(1978) (finding that an individual may “claim to be the victim of a violation occasioned
by the mere existence of secret measures or of legislation permitting secret measures,
without having to allege that such measures were in fact applied to him”).
97. Professors Vladeck and Swire, among others, have also suggested that the
recent pull-back in standing requirements for data breach litigation indicates that the
ruling in Clapper is not a per se ban on cases involving U.S. foreign intelligence. See Affidavit of
Stephen I. Vladeck, supra note 9, ¶¶ 89–98; Affidavit of Peter Swire, supra note 76, at 7-38.
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nationals in the context of foreign surveillance,98 EU officials have still
expressed concerns regarding the availability of redress mechanisms
because of the standing requirement.99
II.

CROSS-BORDER DATA TRANSFER MECHANISMS

The law governing cross-border data transfers can be divided into
two groups: (1) commercial transfers and (2) law enforcement
transfers. As noted, the validity of a commercial transfer from the
European Union to the United States is dependent upon the adequacy
of the safeguards surrounding the transfer. In the case of EU-U.S.
commercial data transfers, this adequacy was first challenged in Data
Protection Commissioner v. Schrems (Schrems I).100 In contrast, law
enforcement access to user information stored in foreign jurisdictions
is governed by MLATs. Ultimately, it is the failure of both of these
mechanisms to ensure safe, effective, and efficient transfer of user
information that will ultimately cause de facto localization.
A. Commercial Data Transfers
To date only ten countries have received an adequacy decision from
the European Commission based upon the country’s domestic laws.101
Unsurprisingly, the United States is not one of these countries. Thus,
U.S. companies processing EU users’ personal information must
transfer data under an international commitment to use adequate
safeguards, contractual clauses, or one of the derogations listed in
Article 26 of the Directive.
Prior to the Schrems I decision, U.S. entities under the jurisdiction of
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the Department of
Transportation (DOT)102 could transfer EU user data to and from the
98. Timothy Edgar, More on Standing as a Barrier to Surveillance Challenges: Bug or
Feature?, LAWFARE (Oct. 28, 2015, 4:14 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/morestanding-barrier-surveillance-challenges-bug-or-feature.
99. See DPC Draft Decision, supra note 75, ¶ 54; see also ECJ Referral, supra note 83, ¶ 222.
100. Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r (Schrems I), 2014 E.C.R. 6.
101. See Commission Decisions, supra note 40 (listing Andorra, Argentina, Canada,
Switzerland, Faroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Jersey, and New Zealand as
nations that provide adequate safeguards for personal data).
102. Generally, the FTC has jurisdiction over “acts or practices in or affecting
commerce by any ‘person, partnership, or corporation.’” Int’l Trade Admin., U.S.
Dep’t of Commerce, How to Join Privacy Shield Part I, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK,
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=How-to-Join-Privacy-Shield-part-1
(last
visited Feb. 7, 2018) [hereinafter How to Join Privacy Shield]. However, this is limited,
and the FTC does not have jurisdiction “over most depository institutions . . . ,
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European Union under the Safe Harbor Framework. Adopted in 2000,
the Safe Harbor Framework was a direct response to the passage of the
Directive and was designed to limit the negative impact of the inherent
differences between the EU and U.S. approaches to privacy,
international trade, and investment.103 The Safe Harbor Framework is
an example of an Article 25 international commitment, negotiated by
EU-U.S. officials, whereby the United States ensures that the transfers are
conducted with an adequate level of protection.104 These protections are
reflected in the Safe Harbor Framework principles, which mirrored key
concepts in the Directive, such as notice, choice, and security.105 U.S.
companies processing EU user data were then able to certify
compliance with the principles and transfer data under the Framework.
In 2014, Maximillian Schrems, an Austrian privacy advocate, filed a
case before the Irish Data Protection Agency (DPA) against Facebook’s
Irish subsidiary arguing that, under EU legal standards, U.S. law failed
to provide adequate protections against U.S. mass surveillance.106
Mr. Schrems’s claim was a direct response to the Snowden revelations,107
and he argued that Facebook’s alleged cooperation with the NSA’s
PRISM program and involvement in continued mass surveillance was
a breach of the principles reflected in the Data Protection Acts of 1988
and 2003108 and the conditions of the Safe Harbor Decision.109

telecommunications and interstate transportation common carrier activities, air carriers,
labor associations, most non-profit organizations, and most packer and stockyard
activities.” Id. The DOT has jurisdiction over U.S. and foreign air carriers. Id.
103. See WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 32, at 5.
104. Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary
Codes, 6 ISJLP 355, 390–91 (2011).
105. Id. at 391.
106. See Written Observations of Applicant ¶¶ 21–23, Case C-362/14, Schrems I, 2014 E.C.R.
6, [hereinafter Written Observations] http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/CJEU_subs.pdf.
107. See Outline Written Submissions at 2–3, Case C-362/14, Schrems I, 2014 E.C.R.
6 (claiming that in “light of the then recent revelations of . . . Edward Snowden and
admissions by USA authorities that the so-called ‘PRISM’ program existed, it was clear
that, despite the ‘self-certification’ by Facebook Inc. under the Safe Harbour system
an ‘adequate protection’ was factually not provided”).
108. The Data Protection Acts of 1988 and 2003 are two pieces of Irish
implementing legislation that give effect to the Directive. DATA PROT. COMM’R, DATA
PROTECTION ACTS 1988 AND 2003:
INFORMATION CONSOLIDATION 3 (2009),
https://www.dataprotection.ie/documents/legal/DPAConsolMay09.pdf.
109. Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided
by the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued
by the US Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215), 25/08/2000 p. 0007-00047.
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After losing in the lower court,110 Mr. Schrems appealed this decision
to the Irish High Court of Judicial Review, which found that Mr.
Snowden’s revelations were credible and that, once personal data was
transferred to the United States, the NSA and FBI were able to access the
personal information through mass and indiscriminate surveillance and
collection of data.111 While the High Court recognized this behavior as
a violation of Irish constitutional and data protection law, it also
recognized that the issue ultimately involved the interpretation and
application of EU law and thus referred the case to the CJEU.112
In analyzing Mr. Schrems’s claim, the CJEU reviewed the Safe
Harbor Framework holistically and in conjunction with the Directive.
It determined that U.S. laws did not provide an adequate level of
protection essentially equivalent to EU laws because the U.S.
government permitted generalized access to electronic information
and failed to provide redress mechanisms.113 Ultimately, the CJEU
struck down the Safe Harbor as a valid mechanism for transfers from
the European Union to the United States.114
Following the invalidation of the Framework in Schrems I, the
decision had several impacts on EU-U.S. relations. The immediate
consequence of the CJEU’s decision was that all data transfers from the
United States to the European Union under the Safe Harbor regime
were now in violation of the Directive.115 However, the Directive still
allowed companies to use SCCs or other derogations (e.g., consent) as
an alternative transfer mechanisms.116
Companies were able to use these alternatives until the European
Union and United States successfully negotiated the Privacy Shield.117

110. Written Observations, supra note 106, ¶ 1 (explaining that existing safe harbor
laws protect data transferred from the EU to the United States).
111. Opinion of Advocate General Bot ¶ 36, Case C-362/14, Schrems I, 2014 E.C.R. 6.
112. Id. ¶ 40.
113. Schrems I, 2014 E.C.R. ¶¶ 81–82, 93, 95; Charter of Rights, supra note 26, art. 7.
114. McCann Fitzgerald, Commercial Court Affirms Legal Principles on Admission of an
Amicus Curiae, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=8be84b34-c0b7-4a66-9542-fdde0db0e269.
115. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
on the Transfer of Personal Data from the EU to the United States of American Under Directive
95/46/EC following the Judgment by the Court of Justice in Case C-362/14 (Schrems), at 4 COM
(2015) 566 final (Nov. 6, 2015).
116. Id.
117. See supra notes 49–101.
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Known as the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield,118 this agreement sought to
remedy the problems illuminated in Schrems I and allow individual
companies to self-certify their commitment to the Privacy Shield
Principles.119 Similar to the Safe Harbor Framework, the Privacy Shield
requires that certified parties implement and maintain adequate
safeguards for transfer.120 These requirements are outlined in the
Privacy Shield Principles and include concepts such as notice, choice,
accountability for onward transfer, security, data integrity, purpose
limitation, access, recourse, enforcement, and liability.121
The Privacy Shield also specifically sought to address gaps noted in
Schrems I by requiring specific measures for the maintenance of data
transfers and storage, providing access to dispute resolution
mechanisms, and ensuring accountability of data providers.122 More
specifically, the Privacy Shield requires strict user notice requirements,
provides user data access rights, and extends guarantees under the
Privacy Act to EU citizens.123 The Privacy Shield also created five
redress mechanisms, which have since been implemented in the

118. See INT’L TRADE ADMIN., EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK PRINCIPLES ISSUED
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 1, https://www.privacyshield.gov/servlet/
servlet.FileDownload?file=015t00000004qAg (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (discussing the
general principles of Privacy Shield).
119. Int’l Trade Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Privacy Shield Overview, PRIVACY SHIELD
FRAMEWORK, https://www.privacyshield.gov/Program-Overview (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
120. Id.
121. Int’l Trade Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Requirements of Participation,
PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK, https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=Requirementsof-Participation (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
122. See Int’l Trade Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Key New Requirements: EU-U.S.
Privacy Shield Framework Key New Requirements for Participating Companies, PRIVACY SHIELD
FRAMEWORK, https://www.privacyshield.gov/Key-New-Requirements (last visited Feb. 7,
2018).
123. See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (to be codified at 5
U.S.C. § 552a) (stating that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any Federal, State[,] or local
government agency to deny to any individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided
by law because of such individual’s refusal to disclose his social security account
number”); SHARA MONTELEONE & LAURA PUCCIO, EURO. PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH
SERV., PE 595.892, FROM SAFE HARBOUR TO PRIVACY SHIELD: ADVANCES AND
SHORTCOMINGS TO THE NEW EU-US DATA TRANSFER RULES 23–24 (2017) (clarifying that
Privacy Shield “transforms this principle into a fully-fledged right of data subjects”);
Privacy Shield: Impact of Trump’s Executive Order, HUNTON & WILLIAMS (Jan. 28, 2017),
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2017/01/28/privacy-shield-impact-of-trumpsexecutive-order.
BY THE
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United States through the JRA.124 From a national security perspective,
as a part of the Privacy Shield negotiations, the United States also
declassified minimization procedures under section 702 of FISA125 and
expanded the privacy protections in the PPD-28 to better align
American practice with European expectations.126
On July 12, 2016, the European Commission issued its adequacy
decision regarding the Privacy Shield, finding that the new framework
ensured an adequate level of protection for data transfers.127 While
this decision was well received by U.S. and EU businesses, the Privacy
Shield has been widely criticized,128 with EU commentators calling into
question the long-term validity of the agreement.129
Finally, as a part of the EU-U.S. negotiations, the European Union
and the United States also agreed that the Privacy Shield would
124. See Sheila Miller & Tracy P. Marshall, Obama Signs Judicial Redress Act—Will It
Move EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Forward?, NAT’L LAW REV. (Feb. 27, 2016)
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/obama-signs-judicial-redress-act-will-it-moveeu-us-privacy-shield-forward (noting that the redress mechanisms allow EU citizens to
seek redress remedies from the federal government in U.S. courts for alleged privacy
violations); see also Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-126, 130 Stat. 282 (to
be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a note).
125. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1782
(to be codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885); see Minimization Procedures Used by the
National Security Agency in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information
Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, As Amended, ODNI
(last visited Feb. 7, 2018) https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Minimization
%20Procedures%20used%20by%20NSA%20in%20Connection%20with%20FISA%2
0SECT%20702.pdf (discussing the declassification procedures).
126. See Directive on Signals Intelligence Activities, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1
(Jan. 17, 2014).
127. See Commission Implementing Decision of 12.7.2016 Pursuant to Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of
Protection Provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, art. 1, ¶ 13, C (2016) 4176 final,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/privacy-shield-adequacydecision_en.pdf (“Based on the findings developed in recitals (136)–(140), the
Commission concludes that the United States ensures an adequate level of protection
for personal data transferred under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield from the Union to selfcertified organisations in the United States.”).
128. See, e.g., Jan Philipp Albrecht, EU-US Privacy Shield: EU Commission Signs Blank
Cheque for Data Transfers, EURO. FREE ALLIANCE (July 12, 2016 https://www.greensefa.eu/en/article/press/eu-us-privacy-shield (arguing that the Privacy Shield does not
address the concerns outlined in the CJEU Safe Harbor decisions); Jedidiah Bradley,
Model Clauses in Jeopardy with Irish DPA Referral to CJEU, IAPP (May 25, 2016),
https://iapp.org/news/a/model-clauses-in-jeopardy-with-irish-dpa-referral-to-cjeu
(commenting on the Article 29 Working Group’s criticisms and the inability of an
Article 31 group to reach an agreement on the Privacy Shield).
129. See MONTELEONE & PUCCIO, supra note 123, at 31–32.
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undergo an annual review to ensure that it continues to meet adequacy
standards.130 If, through a review, the Commission finds that the
Privacy Shield fails to maintain adequate protections, the Commission
can use the review as the basis to re-negotiate parts or all of the Privacy
Shield.131 The first review of the Privacy Shield was conducted in
September 2017; while all parts of the Privacy Shield were upheld,132 the
Commission commented that there was still room for improvement.133
Since the EU Commission’s adequacy determination for the Privacy
Shield was rendered, its validity has been challenged twice. Digital
Rights Ireland134 brought the first challenge on September 16, 2016, in
EU General Court seeking the annulment of the determination on the
basis that the Shield failed to provide sufficient substantive changes
from the Safe Harbor Framework.135 This challenge was dismissed on
November 22, 2017, for lack of admissibility.136 However, a French
advocacy group, La Quadrature du Net,137 has also challenged the
Commission’s decision and is arguing that the Shield not only
continues to violate the Charter, but also fails to provide effective
130. Letter from Ken Hyatt, Deputy Under Sec’y for Int’l Trade, Int’l Trade Admin.,
to Vera Jourová, Comm’r for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equal., European
Comm’n (July 7, 2016), https://www.privacyshield.gov/servlet/servlet.FileDownload?
file=015t00000004q0v (agreeing to a joint review mechanism as a part of the Privacy
Shield’s implementation).
131. Tom De Cordier et al., EU-US Privacy Shield Under High Scrutiny, LEXOLOGY
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a7550caf-cfa24717-b266-c7dc3c5a9f15.
132. EUROPEAN COMM’N, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL ON THE FIRST ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE
EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD 4 (Oct. 18, 2017), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0611&from=EN.
133. Press Release, European Comm’n, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: First Review Shows
It Works but Implementation Can Be Improved (Oct. 18, 2017),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3966_en.htm.
134. Digital Rights Ireland is a non-profit organization dedicated to “[c]ivil,
[h]uman and [l]egal rights in a digital age.” About Digital Rights Ireland, DIGITAL RIGHTS
IR, https://www.digitalrights.ie/about (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). The organization
actively files constitutional challenges against the Irish government in relation to
internet and telephone regulations and policies. Id.
135. Action Brought on 16 September 2016—Digital Rights Ir. v. Comm’n (Case T670/16,), ¶ 8, 2016 O.J. (C 410) 26, 27, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/TXT/PDF/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2016.410.01.0026.01.ENG.
136. Case T-670/16, Digital Rights Ir. v. Comm’r, ¶¶ 45–54 (Nov. 22, 2017),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=197141&pageIn
dex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=30038.
137. Who Are We?, LA QUADRATURE DU NET, https://www.laquadrature.net/en/whoare-we (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
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redress mechanisms.138 While this case is in its infant stages, it will likely
work its way up to the CJEU, and the outcomes of Schrems II and
Microsoft Ireland will certainly impact the CJEU’s decision.
While the Privacy Shield provides a mechanism for companies to certify
use of adequate safeguards, the Shield only applies to companies under
the FTC’s or DOT’s jurisdiction.139 Companies not falling under this
jurisdiction have generally relied upon SCCs, which provide an
adequate basis for transfer under Article 26(2) of the Directive.140 The
European Commission has rendered two sets of clauses adequate, and
entities are able to insert these clauses verbatim into their data transfer
contracts.141 However, in Schrems II, discussed below in Section IV.A,
Mr. Schrems is challenging the adequacy of these clauses.142
B.

Law Enforcement Access

U.S. local, state, and federal law enforcement entities are able to
compel user data maintained in foreign jurisdictions using the MLAT
process.143 MLATs are bilateral and regional treaties governing both
U.S. law enforcement’s acquisition of user data from foreign
jurisdictions and vice-versa.144 These treaties provide a mechanism for
U.S. law enforcement to obtain personal data of foreign individuals
held under a foreign jurisdiction’s law.145
To obtain records via the MLAT process, a domestic prosecutor,
whether in the United States or abroad, must first ensure that the
request meets local warrant or subpoena standards.146 Thus, when
138. Case T-738/16, Action Brought on 25 October 2016—La Quadrature du Net
and Others v. Comm’n (Case T-738/16), ¶ 1–2, 2017 O.J. (C 6) 39, 39, http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62016TN0738.
139. How to Join Privacy Shield, supra note 102.
140. Model Contracts, supra note 47.
141. Top Ten—EU Data Transfers: Comparing the Proposed Privacy Shield to the Standard
Contractual Clauses, ASS’N OF CORP. COUNSEL (May 24, 2016), http://www.acc.com/
legalresources/publications/topten/transferring-personal-data.cfm.
142. See infra Section II.B.
143. Virginia M. Kendall & T. Markus Funk, The Role of Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties in Obtaining Foreign Evidence, LITIG., Winter 2014, at 59, 60 (2014) (describing
MLATs as a “well-worn tool in the prosecutor’s toolbox”).
144. ANDREW K. WOODS, GLOB. NETWORK INITIATIVE, DATA BEYOND BORDERS: MUTUAL
LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE 3 (2015), https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/
sites/default/files/GNI%20MLAT%20Report.pdf.
145. See id. (describing a hypothetical where Indian law enforcement officials seek
to obtain email records from a U.S. company and use the MLATs to retrieve the data).
146. Yonatan L. Moskowitz, MLATS and the Trusted Nation Club: The Proper Cost of
Membership, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 3 (2016).
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seeking to serve a warrant on the foreign jurisdiction, a U.S. prosecutor
must first meet domestic probable cause standards and obtain a
warrant before sending the request to the foreign jurisdiction.147
When foreign entities seek user data held in the United States, foreign
requests for user data must first make a probable cause showing and
comply with the terms of the relevant MLAT and the ECPA.148
Whether the request meets these standards is determined by the DOJ’s
Office of International Affairs, the relevant DOJ field office and district
court in the company’s jurisdiction, and by the company itself.149
While this process ensures constitutional protections for user data in the
jurisdiction in which it is maintained, it also creates extensive
delays.150 Requests from the United States to access data held in a foreign
jurisdiction, regardless of the type of legal process, can take anywhere from
six weeks to ten months or longer.151 Thus, many critics have argued that
the MLAT system is archaic, inefficient, and needs substantial reform.152
III.

CASES

At the time of writing, two relevant cases are pending before the
CJEU and U.S. Supreme Court. In these cases, parties are challenging
cross-border data transfers on the basis of privacy concerns and the
alleged scope of law enforcement access to data.

147. Id.
148. See Foreign Government Access to User Data, KATE WESTMORELAND,
http://www.katewestmoreland.com/new-page-1 (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (explaining
the full process of MLAT requests).
149. MARK A. RUSH & JARED A. KEPHART, K & L GATES, LIFTING THE VEIL ON THE MLAT
PROCESS: A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO MLA REQUESTS 4 (2017),
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/669681d7-12d7-451e-8240a33cf67c959f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ec5fc22d-3e3c-4607-bcb3f4e99e3f59b4/GE_Alert_01202017.pdf.
150. Id. at 8.
151. See Mailyn Fidler, MLAT Reforms: Some Thoughts from Civil Society, LAWFARE
(Sept. 11, 2015, 12:22 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/mlat-reform-somethoughts-civil-society (noting that the process is designed to protect rights, but this
results in delays that incentivize countries to find faster ways of accessing data).
152. See id. (arguing that other countries have difficulty complying with the U.S.
standard for MLATs and that the three main issues with such requests are lack of
protection for metadata requests, the time delay of processing, and the reduction in
the amount of data shared through the response process).
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Schrems II

After Schrems I, Mr. Schrems filed a second complaint with the Irish
DPA challenging the validity of the SCCs.153 Referred to as “Schrems II,”
the case claims that the SCCs do not adequately protect data transfers
to the United States because such data can still be surveilled by U.S.
intelligence authorities.154
Procedurally, this case is unusual.155 Following Mr. Schrems’s
application, the Irish Data Protection Commission commenced an
investigation into the adequacy standards of U.S. laws under the
Directive.156 To assist in the investigation, the Commissioner sought
The Commissioner
the opinions from independent experts.157
determined that while remedies for redress may be available to EU
residents, such remedies were fragmented. Additionally, because the
SCCs were not binding on U.S. law enforcement, there was no guarantee
that they would actually be able to protect EU user data from unbridled
law enforcement access.158 Ultimately, the Commissioner concluded
that while she questioned the validity of the clauses under the EU
Charter, she was unable to render a final decision until the Irish High
Court or the CJEU rendered a decision on the validity of the clauses.159
The Irish High Court took up the case and reviewed the
Commissioner’s draft decision. Ultimately, the High Court concurred
with the Commissioner’s finding regarding the validity of the SCCs.160
The High Court, however, also found itself in a jurisdictional bind
because a dismissal of the case would be tacit approval of the SCCs.161 On
October 3, 2017, the Irish High Court formally referred Schrems II to the
CJEU for a preliminary ruling on the validity of the SCCs.162 While there
is no timeline for the completion of this case, given that eighty-eight

153. See Schrems II, [2016] IEHC 414, ¶ 2 (Hi. Ct.) (Ir.); see also Jedidiah Bracy, Model
Clauses in Jeopardy with Irish DPA Referral to CJEU, IAPP (May 25, 2016),
https://iapp.org/news/a/model-clauses-in-jeopardy-with-irish-dpa-referral-to-cjeu.
154. Schrems II, [2016] IEHC 414, ¶ 3.
155. See Judgment of Justice Costello, Schrems II [2016] No. 4809 P. (Hi. Ct.) (Ir.).
156. Id. ¶¶ 2–3.
157. DPC Draft Decision, supra note 75, ¶ 42.
158. Id. ¶ 61.
159. Id. ¶ 63.
160. ECJ Referral, supra note 83, ¶ 333.
161. Id. ¶¶ 333–34.
162. Id. ¶ 5; see Commission Decision 2011/497/EC of June 2001, 2001 O.J. (L 181)
19; Commission Decision 2004/915/EC of 27 December 2004, 2004 O.J. (L 385) 74;
Commission Decision 2010/87/EU of 5 February 2010, 2010 O.J. (L 39) 5.
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percent of companies use SCCs to transfer personal data from the
European Union to the United States, this case will be heavily watched.163
B. Microsoft Corp. v. United States (Microsoft Ireland)
The final case impacting cross-border data transfers of user data is
the Microsoft Ireland case, now before the U.S. Supreme Court.164 In
this case, U.S. law enforcement sought to compel the production of
two Microsoft email accounts.165 While the warrants were properly
served upon Microsoft in Washington, the data sought was stored in
Microsoft’s data center166 in Dublin, Ireland.167 Microsoft filed a
motion to quash, arguing that the SCA did not authorize federal courts
to compel the production of data stored outside of the United States.168
The Southern District of New York rejected this argument, and
Microsoft promptly appealed.169
The Second Circuit reversed and held that an SCA warrant could
not compel data stored in a foreign jurisdiction.170 Using basic
statutory analysis, the Second Circuit determined that the primary
focus of the SCA is the privacy of stored communications, and thus,171
courts should apply the law of the jurisdiction where the invasion of
163. Lee Matheson, Understanding “Schrems 2.0,” IAPP (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://iapp.org/news/a/understanding-schrems-2-0.
164. Andrew Keane Woods, A Primer on Microsoft Ireland, the Supreme Court’s
(Oct.
16,
2017),
Extraterritorial
Warrant
Case,
LAWFARE
https://www.lawfareblog.com/primer-microsoft-ireland-supreme-courtsextraterritorial-warrant-case.
165. See In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained
by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (stating that Microsoft
“move[d] to quash a search warrant to the extent that it direct[ed] Microsoft to
produce the contents of one of its customer’s e-mails where that information is stored
on a server located in Dublin, Ireland”), rev’d, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), petition for
cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 17-2 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017).
166. A data center is a location where computer servers, containing any form of
computerized information, are kept.
How a Data Center Works, SAP,
http://www.sapdatacenter.com/article/data_center_functionality (last visited Feb. 7,
2018). A corporation may have a server room or use a data center, depending upon
the size of the company and the number of servers in the enterprise. Id. Key
characteristics of data centers include redundant power supplies, cooling systems, and
controlled access. Id.
167. Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft
Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d at 468.
168. Id. at 470.
169. Id. at 476.
170. Id. at 222.
171. Id. at 216–17.
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privacy occurred.172 According to the Second Circuit, because the actual
intrusion into the user’s privacy occurred in the Irish data center, the
court ruled that Irish law would apply instead of the SCA.173
Consequently, U.S. law enforcement must obtain a MLAT to the foreign
jurisdiction in order to obtain user data held by U.S. companies abroad.174
Since the Second Circuit’s holding, nine magistrate and district
court judges across the United States have considered and rejected the
Second Circuit’s conclusion.175 In these cases, the courts found that
the SCA did not apply extraterritorially and that the invasion of the
user’s privacy occurred in the United States, where the disclosure of
the information occurred, rather than in the foreign jurisdiction.176
In response to the Second Circuit’s decision, the U.S. Solicitor
General filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.177

172. Id. at 217–20 (determining the focus of the SCA after reviewing the plain text,
procedural provisions, and legislative history of the statute).
173. Id. at 220.
174. Id.
175. See In re Search Warrant Issued to Google, Inc., No. 5:17-mj-532-HNJ, 2017 WL
4022806, at *9 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 2017); In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-1 to
Google, No. 16-960, 2017 WL 3535037, at *6, 11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2017); In re Search
of Content Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mc-80263-RS, 2017
WL 3478809, at *2, 5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017); In re Search of Info. Associated with
[redacted]@gmail.com That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16mj-00757 (BAH), 2017 WL 3445634, at *1, 27 (D.D.C. July 31, 2017); In re Search of
Info. Associated with Accounts Identified as [redacted]@gmail.com, No. 2:16-mj02197-DUTY-1, 2017 WL 3263351, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 13, 2017); In re Search Warrant
to Google, Inc., No 16-4116, 2017 WL 2985391, at *12 (D.N.J. July 10, 2017); In re Two
Email Accounts Stored at Google, Inc., No. 17-M-1235, 2017 WL 2838156, at *3–4 (E.D.
Wis. June 30, 2017); In re Search of Premises Located at [redacted]@yahoo.com, No.
6:17-mj-1238 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2017), slip op. 3; In re Info. Associated with One Yahoo
Email Address That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Yahoo, No. 17-M-1234, 2017
WL 706307, at *2–3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 21, 2017).
176. Search Warrant Issued to Google, Inc., No. 5:17-mj-532-HNJ, 2017 WL 4022806, at
*3, 9; Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-1 to Google, No. 16-960, 2017 WL 3535037, at *10;
Search of Content Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mc-80263-RS, 2017
WL 3478809, at *5; Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@gmail.com that Is Stored at
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mj-00757 (BAH), 2017 WL 3445634, at *5, 25;
Search Warrant to Google, Inc., No 16-4116, 2017 WL 2985391, at *9, 11; Two Email
Accounts Stored at Google, Inc., No. 17-M-1235, 2017 WL 2838156, at *4; Search of Info.
Associated with Accounts Identified as [redacted]@gmail.com, No. 2:16-mj-02197-DUTY-1,
2017 WL 3263351, at *8–9; Info. Associated with One Yahoo Email Address that Is Stored at
Premises Controlled by Yahoo, No. 17-M-1234, 2017 WL 706307, at *3.
177. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197 (2d. Cir. 2016), petition for cert. granted sub nom. United
States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 17-2 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017).
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Similar to the lower courts, the Solicitor General argued that the
Second Circuit’s logic is incorrect because the focus of the SCA is on
the disclosure by the company, not the privacy of the stored
communications.178 Thus, according to the Solicitor General, the
court should have used the law of the jurisdiction where the company
disclosed the communication to U.S. law enforcement, rather than the
law where the privacy violation occurred.179
On October 16, 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari for this
case.180 While commentators tend to believe that the Court will side
with the U.S. government, there are troubling implications for either
side’s success.181 If the Court sides with Microsoft, law enforcement will
be required to use MLATs to compel data held by U.S. companies in
foreign jurisdictions.182
Alternatively, a decision for the U.S.
government may undermine the success of U.S. interests in Schrems II
because the U.S. government will be applying U.S. law to EU residents
rather than EU law, thus increasing the optics that U.S. law
enforcement has unrestrained access to EU user data.183
Whereas the CJEU data privacy cases limit the cross-border movement
of user data for commercial purposes, the Microsoft Ireland case could limit
law enforcement access to user data held by U.S. corporations in foreign
jurisdictions. However, the cases are linked in two key ways. First, for
a company to comply with a domestic court order for data held in a

178. Id. at 12.
179. Id. at 14.
180. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017) (mem.) (granting certiorari).
181. Jennifer Daskal, There’s No Good Decision in the Next Big Data Privacy Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/opinion/data-abroad-privacycourt.html (outlining the immediate consequences of the Court’s decision).
182. See Press Release, Sen. Orrin Hatch, Second Circuit Ruling Gives Data Privacy
Bill Momentum in Congress (July 14, 2016), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/2016/7/second-circuit-ruling-gives-data-privacy-bill-momentum-incongress (praising the Second Circuit decision because it will encourage the use of
MLATs in obtaining information stored abroad).
183. See Brief of the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 1–4, United States v. Microsoft, 138 S. Ct.
356 (2017) (mem.) (No. 17-2), 2017 WL 6383224, at *14 [hereinafter Brief of the
European Commission] (describing the European Union’s interest in the case and the
relevant EU laws relevant to the Court’s decision); Lee Matheson, European Commission
Weighs in on Microsoft Ireland Case, IAPP (Dec. 17, 2017), https://iapp.org/
news/a/european-commission-weighs-in-on-microsoft-ireland-case (commenting that
while the EU amici appear not to support either side before the Supreme Court, there
is a strong implication that the European Union would like the Supreme Court to
force U.S. law enforcement to rely upon the existing MLAT system).
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foreign jurisdiction, the company must transfer the data from the
foreign jurisdiction to the United States in order to disclose the
information to U.S. law enforcement. If the data is stored in the European
Union, this transfer automatically implicates either the use of the
Privacy Shield, SCCs, or other tools for transfers. Second, because the
Microsoft Ireland case also impacts the scope of law enforcement’s access
to user data, the decision will be considered in the CJEU’s decision in
Schrems II and other challenges to the Privacy Shield.184
IV.

THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

A holding for Mr. Schrems and Microsoft in Schrems II and Microsoft
Ireland, respectively, and a successful challenge to the Privacy Shield
will ultimately require companies to localize data to ensure compliance
with de facto localization regimes. This localization will ultimately
undermine user data privacy and security by removing Fourth
Amendment protections from user data and limiting the ability of
companies to effectively implement scalable security tools.
A.

Impact of Localization

If the respective high courts affirm Schrems II and Microsoft Ireland,
those decisions will advance data localization in two ways: (1) by
removing legal cross-border data transfer mechanisms for commercial
data transfers and (2) by assigning territoriality to data for law
enforcement purposes. On their own, the CJEU cases facilitate
localization by highlighting the fundamental differences in EU and
U.S. approaches to privacy by explicitly calling the U.S. approach
inadequate—not once, but twice. Further, because the SCCs and
Privacy Shield are based on the same adequacy standard, the
invalidation of the SCCs would also bolster any challenge to the Privacy
Shield and make it very difficult for the CJEU to uphold the latter
framework. Thus, despite the changes made by the United States
following the invalidation of the Safe Harbor regime, a further
invalidation of the SCCs and the Privacy Shield would suggest that the
privacy differences between the United States and the European
Union are irreconcilable. The Microsoft Ireland case furthers the trend
toward data localization by ensuring that the law of the territory where

184. Brief of the European Commission, supra note 183, at *14 (noting that under
the GDPR, compliance with a foreign court order does not make the transfer lawful).
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data is held controls law enforcement access to this data.185 For
practical purposes, U.S. companies must retain data in one country
once the data is created because each cross-border transfer would
require a new MLAT.186 While the cases individually restrict the flow
of data across borders, taken together, the cases effectively erect
territorial boundaries and limit the ability of companies and law
enforcement agencies to move and access data.
1.

The CJEU data privacy cases and data localization
If the CJEU finds that the SCCs and the Privacy Shield are invalid,
the United States has two options: (1) legislate greater privacy
protections to meet EU standards or (2) localize data.187 Given the
extent of the changes already made, it seems unlikely that Congress
would legislate in favor of greater privacy protections.188 As a part of
the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield negotiations, the United States revised
numerous laws and implemented various protections to increase the
privacy protections for EU citizens’ data.189 Additionally, as reflected
in the Irish Data Protection Commissioner’s draft decision in

185. See supra notes 165–72 and accompanying text (discussing how the court in the
Microsoft Ireland case found that the place where the intrusion of privacy occurred is
the jurisdiction that should control the matter, so American law enforcement must
follow the appropriate jurisdiction’s laws to obtain user information held by U.S.
companies operating overseas).
186. See Jennifer Daskal, The Microsoft Warrant Case: The Policy Issues, JUST SECURITY
(Sept. 8, 2015, 12:48 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/25901/microsoft-warrantcase-policy-issues (commenting on the unstable nature of data, which makes it difficult
for law enforcement to obtain it from any party outside of the United States).
187. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY STATEMENT ON THE DECISION
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD 1 (2016),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-material/pressrelease/art29_press_material/2016/20160726_wp29_wp_statement_eu_us_privacy_s
hield_en.pdf (criticizing the Privacy Shield for not providing stricter guarantees); see
also DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 1149 (4th ed.
2011) (commenting on the compromises made by the European Union in drafting
the Safe Harbor Agreement because of a recognition that the United States would not
pass comprehensive privacy laws).
188. See PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA
FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 151, 178, 173
(1998) (explaining that it is clear to Europeans that the United States will not pass
comprehensive data privacy laws); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and TransAtlantic Privacy, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 717, 737–38 (2001) (arguing that the Directive will
create a bifurcated system of privacy in the United States, where EU citizens are
provided with greater privacy than American citizens under U.S. law).
189. See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text.
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Schrems II,190 several issues of contention turn on key constitutional
differences, such as Article III standing.191 While the Commissioner
may have misinterpreted some of these doctrines,192 by targeting these
long-standing principles of U.S. jurisprudence, the European Union
has given the United States an ultimatum to either adjust basic tenants
of U.S. law or refrain from transferring data. It is thus questionable
whether the United States is able to give anything more at the
negotiating table without overturning decades of legal precedents.
Additionally, from a national security perspective, any further U.S.
concessions would subject the United States to greater restrictions than
its EU counterparts.193 For example, following Schrems I, the United
States amended FISA, declassified the minimization procedures of
§ 702, and expanded the limitations principles of PPD-28 to non-U.S.
citizens, limiting both the practice and appearance of unrestrained
government access to user information and content.194 These protections
are commensurate or exceed those provided by the European Union’s
Directive and GDPR, which allow member states to adopt legislation
restricting the scope of privacy rights when necessary to protect
national security.195 However, because it is unlikely that the United
States can or will make any further changes to its laws that will satisfy EU
authorities, including the European Commission and member state

190. Following Mr. Schrems’s initial complaint, the Data Protection Commissioner
launched an investigation into the allegations. The results of this investigation were
circulated in a draft with the parties. See McCann FitzGerald, Commercial Court Affirms
Legal Principles on Admission of an Amicus Curiae, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 3, 2016),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8be84b34-c0b7-4a66-9542fdde0db0e269.
191. Id. ¶¶ 56, 79, 84 (stating how some U.S. companies have gotten around Fourth
Amendment issues through exceptions to the warrant clause, such as the foreign
intelligence surveillance exception and the third-party doctrine).
192. Id. ¶ 79.
193. See Christopher Wolf & Winston Maxwell, Why the U.S. Is Held to a Higher Data
Protection Standard than France, IAPP (Nov. 2, 2015), https://iapp.org/news/a/why-theu-s-is-held-to-a-higher-data-protection-standard-than-france (discussing how the
French Patriot Act would fail the adequacy test applied to U.S. laws in Schrems);
Timothy Edgar, Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner: Some Inconvenient Truths the
European Court of Justice Ignores, LAWFARE (Oct. 6, 2015, 8:08 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/schrems-v-data-protection-commissioner-someinconvenient-truths-european-court-justice-ignores (arguing that the European Union
should review the surveillance laws of its own member states before passing judgment
on the laws of others).
194. See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text.
195. See Kuner, supra note 49, at 896–97.
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governments, companies will likely be forced to localize data because
there is simply no longer a valid scalable mechanism for transfer.196
Microsoft Ireland and data localization
Although the CJEU data privacy cases impact the movement of user
data for commercial purposes, Microsoft Ireland restricts the movement
of user data for law enforcement purposes. By finding that the privacy
violation occurs at the data center rather than from where disclosure
occurs, the Second Circuit’s decision links data to the territory where
the data is held.197 This decision creates practical problems for U.S.
law enforcement seeking to access data through valid legal processes
and incentivizes foreign governments to implement localization
regimes. First, the holding requires U.S. law enforcement to obtain an
MLAT prior to getting data from U.S. entities storing data abroad, and
each MLAT is specific to a country.198 That means that if a company
transfers the data across borders prior to the execution of the MLAT,199
the MLAT is no longer valid and law enforcement must comply with
an entirely new set of laws. Practically, this gap allows companies to
continually move data across borders in real time and effectively evade
compliance by consistently pointing law enforcement to an alternative
jurisdiction. Thus, if the data does not stop moving across jurisdictions,
2.

196. Id. at 917–18 (noting that the United States wants the European Union “to
make it easier to transfer personal data internationally . . . . This has produced
resentment in the EU about the extent of US lobbying on data protection, and in the
US about pressure from the EU to change its law”).
197. See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 390 (2015)
(discussing the conflict in the case that “pits the location for data against the location
of access, requiring an answer as to which controls”).
198. See supra Section II.B.
199. See ALAN MCQUINN & DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., HOW
LAW ENFORCEMENT SHOULD ACCESS DATA ACROSS BORDERS 13 (2017),
http://www2.itif.org/2017-law-enforcement-data-borders.pdf?_ga=2.185940128.8217
11203.1515263369-2004149087.1515263369 (noting how modern data storage often
causes data to be split amongst multiple locations, so using the physical location in
which data is stored to determine access forces law enforcement to initiate a separate
MLAT request to view the data in each physical location); Dillon Reisman, Where Is
Your Data, Really?: The Technical Case Against Data Localization, LAWFARE (May 22, 2017,
7:00
AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/where-your-data-really-technical-caseagainst-data-localization (suggesting that since it is practically impossible for users to
know where their data is stored, it will also be extremely difficult for law enforcement
to know where necessary data is located such that an MLAT could be served).
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law enforcement will be significantly hindered from acquiring data
essential to criminal and national security investigations.200
Second, because the foreign jurisdiction’s law now controls law
enforcement’s access to the information, countries may be
incentivized to formalize the Second Circuit’s ruling by mandating that
data be held within territorial boundaries of the state. This would
allow the foreign state to not only centralize the information but also
change the laws and standards regulating access.201 Thus, because the
Second Circuit’s holding elevates the position of foreign law and puts
the foreign government in greater control of law enforcement’s ability
to access data within its territorial borders, the Microsoft Ireland holding
provides a platform on which foreign governments can build more
restrictive data localization laws and regulations.
B.

Privacy Impact

Data localization undermines user privacy by granting foreign
governments greater access to user data, limiting the ability of U.S.
companies to defend fundamental rights abroad, and monopolizing
the competitive market for privacy controls. Confining data within a
territorial jurisdiction brings information directly under the control of a
government such that the government can arbitrarily change the rules of
access.202 Then, because of the foreign government’s access, corporations
have less ability to protect users globally.203 Data localization also reduces
the market power of user choice by reducing the number of companies
in any one particular market.204 Thus, there are several ways that
localization benefits foreign governments at the cost of user privacy.

200. MCQUINN & CASTRO, supra note 199, at 13 (explaining that if a company
wanted to impede investigation of data, it could continue splitting the data into
hundreds of pieces, “creating a labyrinthine environment for law enforcement
agencies” trying to get data).
201. See infra note 202 and accompanying text (noting how limiting data
geographically allows local governments to control the regulation of the data).
202. See Chander & Lê, supra note 3, at 735 (commenting that “[t]he end result of
data localization is to bring information increasingly under the control of the local
authorities, regardless of whether that was originally intended”).
203. See Daskal, supra note 17, at 478 (arguing that data localization laws “also
facilitate domestic surveillance by authorizing law enforcement to compel production
of data wherever located, based on the requesting country’s own laws”); Woods, supra
note 23, at 753 (explaining the pros and cons of state direct access to companies by
discussing an incident where South Korean authorities raided Google’s South Korea offices).
204. See infra notes 212–15.
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First, the current MLAT system exports Fourth Amendment
protections worldwide.205 When seeking information through the
MLAT process, foreign law enforcement must show that the legal
process is in compliance with the U.S. Constitution, the ECPA, and the
controlling MLAT.206 This level of privacy protection is higher than
the standards used in many other liberal and authoritarian nations.207
However, once domestic law of the foreign nation controls production
of user data from U.S. companies, these countries can reduce the level
of protection required for law enforcement to obtain the information,
a standard that could be changed based upon a shift in political
winds.208 This is especially dangerous when considered in the national
security context, such as the Charlie Hebdo attacks.209 Following the
205. Jennifer Daskal, Professor, American Univ., Panelist at the American
Enterprise Institute Conference on Domestic Surveillance on Foreign Shores: The
Case of Microsoft’s Servers in Ireland 10 (Oct. 6, 2015) (transcript available at
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Transcript.pdf).
206. See Peter Swire & DeBrae Kennedy-Mayo, How Both the EU and the U.S. Are
“Stricter” than Each Other for the Privacy of Government Requests for Information, 66 EMORY
L.J. 617, 623 (2017) (stating that foreign governments have to meet the standards of
the ECPA and other U.S. laws to gain access to electronic evidence held by U.S.
companies); RUSH & KEPHART, supra note 149, at 4 (discussing how U.S. district courts
are responsible for ensuring MLAT requests are valid under the both the treaty and
the U.S. Constitution before granting the requests); see also Foreign Government Access to
User Data, supra note 148.
207. See Klass v. Germany, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 214, ¶ 75 (1978) (finding that judicial
review is not required prior to intercepting communications); Swire & Kennedy-Mayo,
supra note 206, at 644–45 (commenting on the strength of the probable cause and
probable cause “plus” standards required for search warrants and wiretaps in the
United States in comparison to other countries); Jennifer Granick, The Microsoft
Ireland Case and the Future of Digital Privacy, JUST SECURITY (July 18, 2016, 12:46 PM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/32076/microsoft-ireland-case-future-digital-privacy
(noting that the United States’ “warrant requirement and . . . wiretapping procedures
. . . are generally comparatively stringent,” as compared to EU counterparts); see also
WINSTON MAXWELL & CHRISTOPHER WOLF, A GLOBAL REALITY: GOVERNMENTAL ACCESS
TO DATA IN THE CLOUD 8–9 (2012) (discussing the German system in which German
prosecutors can request certain data from telecommunications services providers if the
information would be helpful to public safety, which can be done upon demand
without a court order).
208. See Peter Swire & Justin D. Hemmings, Mutual Legal Assistance in an Era of
Globalized Communications: The Analogy to the VISA Waiver Program, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 687, 710 (2016); see Daskal, supra note 17, at 490 (emphasizing two likely
scenarios: one is that nations could “race to the bottom” by ignoring foreign citizens’
data privacy rights, and the other is that foreign governments could enact blocking
statutes in order to protect their citizen’s data).
209. See generally Charlie Hebdo Attack: Three Days of Terror, BBC (Jan. 14, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237 (describing the incident on
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attacks, France passed a sweeping surveillance law, referred to as the
French Patriot Act, that enables “intelligence agencies to tap phones
and emails without seeking permission from a judge.”210 While the
French Patriot Act may be unique because of the context in which it
was created, it is not extraordinary in what it attempts to do. Liberal
and authoritarian governments have used national security events to
alter the level required for law enforcement access to information.
This legal malleability invariably threatens user privacy more once the
data is centralized under the government’s control.211
Finally, data localization regulations will limit the number of service
providers within a jurisdiction and create a monopoly on privacy
controls within a country.212 Currently, users have the ability to choose
which service providers to use.213 This has created a market where
corporations must compete for users, and their key currency is user
trust.214 As such, companies that fail to maintain user trust by not

January 7, 2015, in which the headquarters of a controversial French magazine were
attacked by two Islamist shooters).
210. Angelique Chrisafis, France Passes New Surveillance Law in Wake of Charlie Hebdo
Attack, GUARDIAN (May 5, 2015, 12:11 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2015/may/05/france-passes-new-surveillance-law-in-wake-of-charlie-hebdo-attack
(describing how the legislation “will allow authorities to spy on the digital and mobile
phone communications of anyone linked to a ‘terrorist’ inquiry without prior
authorisation”); see Nathan Sales, French Surveillance Law Compared to US Surveillance,
JUST SECURITY (July 31, 2016, 3:04 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/25143/snapshotfrench-surveillance-law-compared-surveillance-law (stating that the legislation gives
the French government “sweeping new powers,” including the authority to wiretap
without a warrant); see also Khaled A. Beydoun, Beyond the Paris Attacks: Unveiling the War
Within French Counterterror Policy, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1313–14 (2016) (commenting
on the disproportionate impact of the “French Patriot Act” on Muslim populations).
211. Chander & Lê, supra note 3, at 737–38.
212. INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & BUS., NO TRADE OFF: HOW THE FREE FLOW OF DATA
ENHANCES TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 12 (2016) (describing how regulations restricting
market access to data companies in some African countries have made it difficult for
these companies to obtain licenses, thus “limiting the number of service providers and
creating a de facto monopoly”).
213. See Daskal, supra note 186 (commenting that “customers may increasingly flee from
U.S. providers in an effort to shield their data from the U.S. government’s reach”).
214. See Jennifer Baker, EU Commission Aims to Ban Forced Data Localization, IAPP
(Oct. 24, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/eu-commission-aims-to-ban-forced-datalocalization (noting that EU Commission Vice President Andrus Ansip has declared
that “trust is everything” in regulating data privacy); see also WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM,
RETHINKING PERSONAL DATA: TRUST AND CONTEXT IN USER-CENTRED DATA ECOSYSTEMS
3 (2014), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_RethinkingPersonalData_Trustand
Context_Report_2014.pdf (describing how companies are losing individuals’ trust
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ensuring proper privacy and security measures can be pushed out of a
market.215 By allowing users to choose between rival providers, the
market hypothetically incentivizes providers to employ better privacy
protocols. However, in order for this market to exist, data must be able
to move across borders.216 The implementation of data localization
regulations will likely result in companies exiting or foregoing
entrance into markets.217 Thus, choices for users will be limited, and
they will be unable to change providers if they are uncomfortable or
disagree with certain privacy controls.218 If the number of corporations
within a territory is limited, the user must either not use the technology
or acquiesce to the privacy controls used by the company.219 This
distinction may be insignificant if the corporation employs adequate
protections, but substantial if the corporation provides backdoor
access to the local government.220

regarding data protection and how they must adapt their practices to respect their
customers’ privacy expectations in order to survive).
215. See Rafi Goldberg, Lack of Trust in Internet Privacy and Security May Deter Economic
and Other Online Activities, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. (May 13, 2016),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2016/lack-trust-internet-privacy-and-security-maydeter-economic-and-other-online-activities (discussing the impact of decreased user
trust on corporations and finding that forty-five percent of households surveyed about
their online activity reported refraining from conducting financial transactions online
due to a lack of trust in internet privacy).
216. Baker, supra note 214.
217. See JAMES M. KAPLAN & KAYVAUN ROWSHANKISH, GLOB. COMM’N ON INTERNET
GOVERNANCE, ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF DATA LOCATION REGULATION IN FINANCIAL
SERVICES 2 (2015) (commenting on inefficiency costs of localization causing financial
corporations to leave markets); Chander & Lê, supra note 3, at 682 (stating that data
localization will increase costs for information service providers in such a manner that
will render “many of such global services impossible”); Natasha Lomas, Twitter Is
Reviewing Whether to Store Some User Data in Russia, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 19, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/19/twitter-is-reviewing-whether-to-store-someuser-data-in-russia (commenting on how LinkedIn has been blocked in Russia for
refusal to comply with data localization regulations).
218. See Chander & Lê, supra note 3, at 720 (explaining Microsoft’s argument that
localizing data could limit customer choice, saying that customers “should have the
ability to personally control their [data and records] by choosing to have their [data]
held by an entity” outside the country).
219. See id. at 716–17 (arguing that because of localization, local companies may
choose or be required to utilize companies with weak security measures that have less
need to offer stronger security measures to attract customers).
220. Backdoor access allows a government direct access via a purposeful security
flaw to user content and information regardless of whether encryption is in place. See
Issue Brief: A “Backdoor” to Encryption for Government Surveillance, CDT (Mar. 3, 2016),
https://cdt.org/insight/issue-brief-a-backdoor-to-encryption-for-government-
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C. Security Impact
Today, companies employ a series of technical and non-technical
controls to identify threats, defend against attacks, and respond to
network intrusions.221 Basic technical controls generally include
deploying firewalls and intrusion detection systems and monitoring to
identify unauthorized access or data exfiltration.222 Non-technical
controls consist of policies and procedures, such as employment of
least privilege,223 development of an incident response plan, and
adherence to a patch management policy.224 A well-structured
information security program will leverage both technical and nontechnical controls to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of information to protect data from bad actors, prevent
intentional change, and ensure access.225

surveillance.
Such access allows governments to conduct warrantless and
indiscriminate surveillance. Id.
221. These concepts are integrated into various U.S. and international
cybersecurity frameworks, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology
Cybersecurity Framework (NIST Framework) and the International Standards
Organization 27001 (ISO 27001) standards.
222. “Firewalls have been a first line of defense in network security for over [twentyfive] years” and are a type of “network security device that monitors incoming and
outgoing network traffic.” What Is a Firewall, CISCO, https://www.cisco.com/
c/en/us/products/security/firewalls/what-is-a-firewall.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
Intrusion detection systems are another type of network security technology that
detects “vulnerability exploits against a target application or computer.” What Is an
Intrusion Detection System?, PALO ALTO NETWORKS, https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/
cyberpedia/what-is-an-intrusion-detection-system-ids (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
223. The principle of least privilege is the idea that a user is only granted the
amount of access to a system that is required for that user to complete his or her job.
Jerome H. Saltzer & Michael D. Schroeder, The Protection of Information in Computer
Systems, Univ. VA, CS551: Security and Privacy on the Internet Fall 2000 (1974),
http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~evans/cs551/saltzer.
224. IT managers use patch management systems to quickly fix emerging
vulnerabilities in operating systems and applications. DANIEL VOLDAL, SANS INST., A
PRACTICAL METHODOLOGY FOR IMPLEMENTING A PATCH MANAGEMENT PROCESS 1 (2003),
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/bestprac/practical-methodologyimplementing-patch-management-process-1206 (explaining the importance of patch
management and its role in systems configurations).
225. See OFFICIAL (ISC)2 GUIDE TO THE CISSP CBK 7 (Adam Gordan ed., 4th ed., 2015).
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Localization will require new servers, people,226 and tools in each
jurisdiction in which the company operates or has users.227 This
replication of systems will create fragmented networks linked to territorial
boundaries within an enterprise.228 By simply stretching and segmenting
the enterprise network, data localization reduces the efficacy of security
practices and tools to detect and respond to cybersecurity threats.229
Instead, by centralizing data in several key data centers throughout the
world, corporations can implement defense-in-depth practices and
reduce redundancies.230 By doing so, corporations are able to ensure
uniform management of the systems, scale prediction and detection
technologies to secure a higher quantity of user data, and leverage the
distributed architecture of the internet to ensure data availability.231

226. See LEVIATHAN SEC. GRP., ANALYSIS OF CLOUD VS. LOCAL STORAGE: CAPABILITIES,
OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES 2 (2015) (outlining the difficulties in cybersecurity hiring
domestically and internationally).
227. See ALBRIGHT STONEBRIDGE GRP., DATA LOCALIZATION: A CHALLENGE TO GLOBAL
COMMERCE AND THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION 7 (2015) (commenting on the
lackluster realized employment gains associated with data center constructions); Paul
Mozur et al., Apple Opening Data Center in China to Comply with Cybersecurity Law, N.Y. TIMES
(July 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/business/apple-china-datacenter-cybersecurity.html (discussing the costs of Apple’s data center in China).
228. See WILLIAM J. DRAKE ET AL., WORLD ECON. FORUM, INTERNET FRAGMENTATION:
AN OVERVIEW 45 (2016) (commenting that data localization results in fragmentation
at the content, routing, and transactional levels).
229. See John Lenhart, Security for the 21st Century Economy: Borders Hold Less
Meaning—and That’s a Good Thing, INFO. TECH. INDUSTRY COUNCIL (Aug. 17, 2016),
http://www.itic.org/news-events/techwonk-blog/security-for-the-21st-centuryeconomy-borders-hold-less-meaning-and-thats-a-good-thing
(commenting
that
localization deprives corporations of comprehensive real time monitoring and limits
deployment of preventative defenses and security controls).
230. Defense in depth is the concept “that a layered approach to network security
makes for a formidable challenge for attackers.” SCOTT RASMUSSEN, SANS INST.,
CENTRALIZED NETWORK SECURITY MANAGEMENT: COMBINING DEFENSE IN DEPTH WITH
MANAGEABLE SECURITY 2 (2002), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/
bestprac/centralized-network-security-management-combining-defense-in-depthmanageable-security-659 (describing comprehensive cybersecurity as one that plugs
diverse methods and technologies into the broadest sampling of the network).
231. See id. (describing how the defense in depth approach makes it much more
difficult for attackers to compromise a network, while “network security personnel are
faced with the same requirement to maintain currency on the diverse architecture as
well as vigilance”).
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This replication of systems is not only expensive to build but also
difficult to manage because it creates non-uniform security practices.232
By decentralizing the governance and response, data localization
essentially creates a federated system within the larger enterprise,
entrusting each country with autonomy over its own systems.233 As a
result, each jurisdiction is able to choose which types of hardware to
use, how to classify incidents, and how to administer privileges.234
To better illustrate this, consider hypothetical company A, a multinational company with customers in the United States, European
Union, Mexico, Brazil, Singapore, and Malaysia. Before localization,
company A has data centers in the United States, Ireland, and India,
and it manages all user data from these data centers. In 2020, Mexico,
Malaysia, and Singapore all pass data localization laws, mandating that
all citizen user data be hosted on servers within the relevant territorial
jurisdiction. Prior to localization, company A only needed three sets
of servers, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and security staff to
manage cybersecurity risks worldwide. In a post-localization world,
company A must maintain six sets of these technical and non-technical
controls, with one in each jurisdiction.
By inserting more humans and machines into the enterprise’s
network, localization not only increases the surface area for attacks,
but also allows for new zero-day exploits235 and alters how each group
will detect and respond to attacks.236 The difference in response can
then be the difference between threat mitigation and breach, with the
232. See SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS. ASS’N, GUIDE TO CLOUD COMPUTING FOR
POLICYMAKERS 5 (2011) (commenting that “uniform security management practices”
enable key security practices).
233. See Allen C. Johnston & Merrill Warkentin, IT Security Governance and Centralized
Security Controls, in ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SYSTEMS ASSURANCE AND SYSTEM SECURITY:
MANAGERIAL AND TECHNICAL ISSUES 24 (Merrill Warkentin & Rayford Vaughn eds.,
2006) (stating that an end-user’s failure to follow through on security protocols in a
decentralized system can potentially compromise the entirety of the network).
234. See Rosslin J. Robles et al., Information Security Control Centralization and IT
Governance for Enterprises, INT’L J. MULTIMEDIA & UBIQUITOUS ENGINEERING, July 2008, at
67, 73 (indicating that in a decentralized system there is “a high level of autonomy for
end users in dealing with the security of their respective computing resources”).
235. A zero-day exploit is “an unknown exploit . . . that exposes a vulnerability in
software or hardware and can create complicated problems well before anyone realizes
something is wrong.” What Is a Zero-Day Exploit?, FIREEYE, https://www.fireeye.com/
current-threats/what-is-a-zero-day-exploit.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
236. See Johnston & Warkentin, supra note 233, at 21 (commenting that a lack of
“motivation or efficacy for compliance with . . . policies and procedures” can have
devastating effects in a decentralized system).
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latter resulting in the exposure of personal records, unwanted public
attention, and regulatory scrutiny.
Additionally, a centralized security system enables a company to
more effectively leverage prediction and detection technologies.237 A
centralized information technology system allows for a company to
have broader insights into its environment, and it also enables the
company to aggregate information from across the network to
determine trends and identify abuse.238 By employing a “big data”
solution to IT security, a corporation can detect incidents more quickly
and reduce the time between intrusion and detection.239
Finally, data localization limits the ability of companies to ensure
system and data availability by leveraging the distributed infrastructure
of the internet.240 Because data can be split, copied, and moved,
companies are able to leverage the internet’s infrastructure to distribute
data to servers in different states, nations, or regions.241 Companies are
able to increase both the efficiency of distribution and security
surrounding the information by sharding the data,242 load balancing it

237. See SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS. ASS’N, supra note 232, at 16 (commenting that
“[c]loud computing creates the ability to link together millions of security nodes” to
better detect threats).
238. RASMUSSEN, supra note 230, at 9.
239. Dwell time is the time from the initial intrusion (e.g., patient zero clicks on a
phishing link) to the time that the intrusion is detected and removed from the system.
ERIC COLE, SANS INST., DETECT, CONTAIN, AND CONTROL CYBERTHREATS 1 (2015),
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/detect-controlcyberthreats-36187; see, e.g., MANDIANT, M-TRENDS 2017: A VIEW FROM THE FRONT
LINES 7 (2017) (reporting average dwell times of roughly one hundred days).
240. Richard Bennett, Surge in Data Localization Laws Spells Trouble for Internet Users,
AEI (May 10, 2016), http://www.aei.org/publication/surge-in-data-localization-lawsspells-trouble-for-internet-users.
241. See Reisman, supra note 199 (giving the example of an email service that makes
a person’s email accessible anywhere in the world, stating that the messages “probably
exist in multiple copies, which could be located in more than one country”).
242. Companies shard data by splitting files into many pieces and spreading the
pieces across distributed systems. While this process not only allows for quick recovery,
it also means that “[n]o single datacenter has all the information required to
reassemble a given document.” Patrick S. Ryan et al., When the Cloud Goes Local: The
Global Problem with Data Localization, COMPUTER, Dec. 2013, at 54, 56.
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across servers,243 and backing it up in multiple areas.244 This enables
companies to more effectively respond to certain threat vectors,245 such
as distributed denial of service attacks, and also mitigate system outages
from an attack.246 Data localization restricts this movement by
mandating that a copy of the data remain within the jurisdiction itself.247
Thus, any balancing or movement of data must occur within the one
network, essentially reducing the strength of the network’s response.
CONCLUSION
The jury is out on whether Mr. Schrems or Microsoft intended for
data localization to occur as a result of their successes. By bringing
these cases, these privacy advocates have highlighted the fundamental
differences in the EU and U.S. approaches to privacy and have put
traditional mechanisms for cross-border data transfers at risk. Thus,
these cases encourage data localization by opening the door for
increased legislation, prohibiting data transfers from the European
Union, and restricting data movement for law enforcement requests.
These limitations, whether for commercial or law enforcement
243. Load balancing allows companies to re-distribute information or traffic
depending upon where information and traffic is concentrated. Load balancing is
important for ensuring the availability of data and the reliability of applications. Load
Balancer, F5 NETWORKS, INC., https://f5.com/glossary/load-balancer (last visited Feb.
7, 2018); What Is Network Load Balancing?, MICROSOFT (Mar. 28, 2003),
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc779570(v=ws.10).aspx; see LEVIATHAN
SEC. GRP., supra note 226, at 3 (describing how geographic redundancy allows
corporations to continue operating despite natural disasters or political disruptions);
see also BROUGH DAVIS, SANS INST., LEVERAGING THE LOAD BALANCER TO FIGHT DDOS 13
(2010), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/firewalls/leveraging-loadbalancer-fight-ddos-33408 (suggesting that global load balancing can be used to
mitigate DDoS attacks).
244. Business Challenge: Backup & Recovery, SYMANTEC, http://www.symantec.com/
computer-backup (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
245. A threat, or attack, vector describes the manner in which a bad actor attempts
to or is successful in compromising the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a
victim’s network. Glossary of Security Terms, SANS INSTIT. (last visited Feb. 7, 2018)
https://www.sans.org/security-resources/glossary-of-terms.
246. During a DDoS attack, an attacker attempts to take down a system or prevent
legitimate users from accessing a site by flooding a network with information. Security
Tip (ST04-015): Understanding Denial-of-Service Attacks, U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY
READINESS TEAM (Feb. 6, 2013), https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-015.
247. Deven Desai, Beyond Location: Data Security in the 21st Century, COMM. ACM, Jan.
2013, at 34, 36 (commenting that “location-based rules falter in a large area such as
the EU” and “fail in smaller markets” because the traffic spikes or DDoS attacks cannot
be distributed to low traffic servers outside of the territorial jurisdiction).

2018]

DATA LOCALIZATION

969

purposes, undermine user privacy and enterprise data security by
placing data under government control and fragmenting corporate
information security practices.
Before the courts affirm these cases, they should consider the true
state of U.S. and EU law and consider the consequences of each case.
Though all litigation has an effect on parties, precedents, and politics,
not all consequences are created equally. A key consequence of these
cases is the fragmentation, which will restrict families, businesses, and
leaders from connecting, profiting, and communicating over the
internet. While these consequences were likely unintended, these
cases have created a territorial regulatory regime for data privacy—a
regime that is antithetical to the free and secure flow of information.
Ultimately, these cases will make user data worldwide more vulnerable
to privacy and security violations by good and bad actors alike.

